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The phrase "collateral damage" refers to harm done to persons, animals, 
or things that agents are not morally permitted to target in the conduct of 
war, as a side effect of attacks on persons, animals, or things that agents are 
morally permitted to target in the conduct of war. Call the first category-
that is, those persons, animals, or things that agents are not morally per-
mitted to target - illegitimate targets of war, and the second category 
legitimate targets of war. Collateral damage, then, refers to harm done to 
illegitimate targets of war as a side effect of attacks on legitimate targets of 
war. As this characterization indicates, a complete response to the ques-
tion of when, if ever, acts of war that cause collateral damage are morally 
justifiable must address harm done to private and public property, domes-
tic and wild animals, and the environment. In this essay, however, I will 
focus solely on harm done to persons who are illegitimate targets of war, 
as a side effect of attacks on legitimate targets. My reason for doing so 
is twofold. First, most historical and contemporary discussion focuses on 
the rightness or wrongness of this particular kind of collateral damage.' 
Second, rightly or wrongly, most people appear to be more concerned 
with harm done to persons than they are with harm done to animals, the 
environment, or inanimate objects. 
Philosophers disagree over what makes a person a legitimate target 
of war. Some argue that only those who directly pose an (unjust) threat 
of harm may be targeted, while others argue that it is merely his or her 
1 For discussion of collateral damage to private property, sec Cohn :VlcKeogh, ln11orrnt 
Civilians: 7/ir Momlity of Killing in \for (:-.Jew York: Palgravc, 2002); Whitley Kaufman, 
"What Is the Scope of Civilian lmmunitv in \\'artimc?"Jo11m11/ of.\Iilitary Fthirs 2 (200:\): 
18li-94. 
I am grateful to Emily Crookston, Heather Cert, Larrv \!av, Terry \lcConnell, and l\lichael 
Zimmerman for their helpful comrncnts 011 a p1-cvious draft of this chapter. 
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being morally responsible for an uajust threat of harm that justifies tar-
geting a person, even if that person does not pose the threat. 2 On either 
view, the category of legitimate targets of war significantly overlaps the 
category of combatants, while the category of illegitimate targets of war 
significantly overlaps the category of noncombatants. Therefore, I will 
sometimes characterize collateral damage as harm done to noncombat-
ants as a side effect of an attack on combatants (or a military target), 
a description commonly employed in public discussion. Nevertheless, 
it is important to remember that the categories of legitimate target of 
war and combatant and the categories of illegitimate target of war and 
noncombatant do not overlap completely. 
We need not resolve the debate over what makes a person morally liable 
to attack in war in order to make significant progress in establishing the 
moral status of wartime acts that cause collateral damage. What such a 
discussion does seem to require, though, is that there be some categorical 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war, since such 
a distinction appears to be essential to the very concept of collateral 
damage. As will become clear later, certain types of alleged justification 
for acts of war that harm noncombatants may find it difficult to justify 
treating this distinction as fundamental. 
One last preliminary point remains before we turn to a moral assess-
ment of collateral damage. Some theorists argue that combatants may 
justifiably kill only if they fight for a just cause, while others argue that 
combatants may justifiably kill even if the state they serve is morally unjus-
tified in going to war. To avoid this debate, I will assume throughout that 
those combatants inflicting collateral damage are members of a state that 
acts permissibly in going to war. 
The discussion of what, if anything, morally justifies collateral damage-
causing acts of war proceeds as follows. In Section I, I criticize the most 
common argumentative strategy employed to defend such acts, namely, 
appeal to the doctrine of double effect. In Section II, I suggest that one 
prominent nonconsequentialist approach to moral theorizing, namely, 
social contract theory broadly construed, will also find it exceedingly dif-
ficult to demonstrate that collateral damage-causing acts of war are per-
missible. Finally, in Section III, I consider consequentialist justifications 
2 Michael Walzer,just and Unjust Wars, 3rd Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Robert 
Fullinwider, "War and Innocence," in International Ethics, ed. Beitz et al. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985);Jeff McMahan, "The Ethics of Killing in War," Ethirs 
114 (2004): 693-733; Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
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for collateral damage. I argue that while such justifications may be more 
plausible than some writers in the just war tradition have thought, there 
are still some reasons to find them unsatisfactory. Thus this chapter points 
to a skeptical conclusion with respect to the moral justifiability of wartime 
acts that inflict collateral damage: given the elusiveness of a compelling 
moral justification for collateral damage, and its practically inevitable 
occurrence in modern armed conflicts, it appears impossible to wage 
war without acting immorally. 
I. The Doctrine of Double Effect and Collateral Damage 
Many contributors to the just war tradition attempt to justify military 
operations that produce collateral damage by appealing to the doctrine 
of double effect (henceforth the DDE)) Applied specifically to acts of war, 
the DDE holds that harm done to noncombatants is morally permissible 
if and only if: 
L The combatant intends to attack a legitimate target of war, and to 
do so in a manner that conforms to the moral constraints on such 
acts. 
2. The combatant does not intend to cause harm to noncombatants 
as a means to achieving his intended goal. Rather, the combatant 
merely foresees that his attack on a legitimate target of war will 
cause harm to illegitimate targets of war as a side effect. 
3. There is a sufficient reason to warrant the combatants' acting in a 
way that can be reasonably expected to cause harm to noncombat-
ants (or illegitimate targets of war, more broadly). 
Conditions 1 and 2 reflect the distinction between legitimate and ille-
gitimate targets of war central to the concept of collateral damage: com-
batants may not aim to harm noncombatants either as an end (condi-
tion 1) or as a means to an end (condition 2). A side effect of an out-
come the combatant intends to bring about, however, is by definition 
one at which he or she does not aim: the combatant may foresee that his 
3 Walzer, just and Unjust Hars, pp. 151-59; Elizabeth Anscomhe, "\Nar and Murder," in 
Nurlrar Wrapons and Christian Consrirnrl', ed. Walter Stein (London: l\-!crlin, 1960); Paul 
Ramsey, 17iejusl liar: Fnrre and l'o/itirnl Hesjionsibilit_)' (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1968). International law, specifically the Geneva Conventions as understood in the 1977 
Protocols, also appears to reflect the DDE: see 1977 Gcm·,·a Protocol I Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1~ August H)J(j. at http: icrc.org/ihl.nsf/\\'ebCON\'FULL: 
Open View. 
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action will result in harm to noncombatants, but he does not intend it. 
Such a combatant respects the distinction between those things he may 
and may not target while waging war. 
That the combatant does not intend to cause harm to noncombatants 
does not suffice to justify his conduct, however. As condition 3 indicates, 
only certain considerations justify causing even unintended harm to non-
combatants. Most discussants of the DDE label this requirement the pro-
portionality condition and describe it as requiring that the harm suffered 
by noncombatants as a result of a given act of war be proportional to the 
good achieved as a result of the same act.4 This formulation of the third 
condition of the DDE can be misleading, however, insofar as it suggests 
that the condition ought to be understood in consequentialist terms. 
That is, it appears to imply that a collateral damage-causing act of war is 
morally justifiable only if that act's good consequences (e.g., the preven-
tion of harm to other noncombatants) outweigh its bad consequences 
(e.g., the harm done to noncombatants killed in the attack). Yet such 
consequentialist reasoning seems antithetical to the apparently noncon-
sequentialist distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war 
essential to the concept of collateral damage, a point I discuss in greater 
detail later in this chapter.5 We do better, I suggest, to use the deliberately 
vague phrase "sufficient reason" when formulating this condition for the 
justifiability of acts under the DDE, since it leaves open the question of 
what counts as a sufficient reason for causing harm to noncombatants, 
as well as the question of what sort of moral reasoning ought to be used 
to justify treating a particular consideration as a sufficient reason. The 
question of how to interpret the third condition of the DDE, which for 
convenience sake I will continue to refer to as the proportionality con-
dition, is taken up at greater length later. For now, the crucial point to 
note is that according to the DDE, the fact that the combatant does not 
intend to harm noncombatants is not enough to show that his conduct 
is morally permissible. 
The attraction of the DDE to many just war theorists lies in the fact that 
it appears to reconcile a nonconsequentialist approach to the morality of 
4 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 153; Henry Shue, "War," in The Oxford Handbook of Practical 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 745-47; Robert L. Holmes, On H'<ir and 
Morality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989): 194. 
5 In anticipation of that discussion, consider the following question: if an act of war that 
harms people is morally justifiable as Jong as it is reasonable to expect that it will produce 
more good than bad, then why should it matter whether those harmed by the act arc 
combatants or noncombatants? 
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warfare with the fact that modern war almost inevitably results in collat-
eral damage. An essential element of a nonconsequentialist moral theory 
is the claim that in some cases it is not permissible to bring about the best 
consequences. People are entitled to be treated (or not treated) in cer-
tain ways, and no amount of good consequences, however understood, 
justifies the failure to treat them in the ways to which they are entitled. 
The right not to be unjustly killed or injured by others is among the most 
important and widely recognized of these entitlements, and the infliction 
of collateral damage in war appears to violate this right. The DDE, and 
in particular the alleged moral significance of the distinction between 
what a combatant intends and what he or she merely foresees, explains 
how combatants can engage in collateral damage-causing activities with-
out violating others' rights. Though agents are never morally permitted 
intentionally to kill someone who has done nothing to forfeit his right 
not to be killed, morality does permit them to perform an act they merely 
foresee will result in the death of such a person, as long as it meets the 
proportionality condition. 
The DDE purports to justify a collateral damage-causing act of war if 
and only if the harm inflicted on noncombatants is unintended and pro-
portional to the good achieved by that act. But what reason do we have to 
think that collateral damage-causing acts of war are morally permissible 
if, but only if, they meet these conditions? To respond to this question, 
its defenders typically attempt to demonstrate that the DDE's prescrip-
tions - that is, what it instructs moral agents to do - match most people's 
intuitive judgments regarding the rightness or wrongness of particular 
acts. Of special relevance here is the claim that the DDE accounts for the 
moral distinction many people intuitively draw between terror bombing 
and tactical bombing. Suppose that both bombers carry out attacks that 
have the same probability of causing the same number of noncombatant 
deaths. What distinguishes them, it is said, is that the terror bomber inten-
tionally targets noncombatants in order to weaken her enemy's morale, 
while the tactical bomber merely foresees that his attack on a legitimate 
target of war will also cause collateral damage. Since the terror bomber 
intends the deaths of noncombatants, her act is morally impermissible. In 
contrast, because the tactical bomber merely foresees, but does not aim 
at, the deaths of noncombatants, his act is morally permissible (assuming 
that it meets the proportionality condition). 
As Jonathan Bennett points out, however, the terror bomber need not 
intend the deaths of the noncombatants, but only the appearance of 
their deaths, since this will suffice as a means to her end of weakening 
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her enemy's morale. 6 That these noncombatants appear dead is what she 
aims at; that they will in fact die as a result of her action is a foreseen, but 
unintended, consequence of making them appear dead. Thus neither the 
terror bomber nor the tactical bomber intends to harm the noncombatants 
her or his actions affect, though both foresee that their actions will result 
in such harm. It appears, therefore, that the DDE does not distinguish 
morally between terror and tactical bombings; insofar as it provides a 
justification for the latter, it also provides a justification for the former. 
The reader might object that the terror bomber must intend to kill 
the noncombatants she does, because their deaths are a necessary part 
of her plan to weaken enemy morale. There is no way for her to make 
these noncombatants appear dead except by doing something to them 
that will in fact cause them to die. In contrast, it might be suggested, the 
noncombatant deaths caused by the tactical bomber are not a necessary 
part of his plan to destroy the legitimate target of war. He can still achieve 
his goal even if, miraculously, his act results in no collateral damage. Yet 
the same is true of the terror bomber; if by some miracle she achieves 
her goal without killing any noncombatants, then this is fine with her. It 
might be objected that no miracle will happen, that the terror bomber 
knows with near certainty that she will achieve her objective only if she 
kills noncombatants, and that therefore she must intend their deaths. 
But similarly, no miracle will happen in the tactical bomber's case. He, 
too, knows with near certainty that achieving his objective will result in 
noncombatant deaths. Therefore, insofar as we are willing to say that the 
tactical bomber need not intend the noncombatant deaths his act will 
cause, so too we ought to say that the terror bomber need not intend the 
noncombatant deaths her act will cause. 
Insofar as many contributors to the just war tradition rely on the DDE 
to distinguish terrorism from morally permissible forms of warfare, the 
foregoing argument already provides a significant challenge for theorists 
of just war. But, in fact, Bennett's argument threatens to undermine the 
practical relevance of the DDE entirely, insofar as it seems possible to 
describe any act in such a way that the bad consequences it produces are 
merely foreseen, but not intended. In principle, the DDE would still dis-
tinguish between morally permissible and impermissible acts. In practice, 
6 Jonathan Bennett, "Morality and Consequences," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
II, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, i981 ): uo-1 i. See 
also Judith Lichtenberg, "War, Innocence, and the Doctrine of Double Effect," Philosoph-
ical Studie57 4 ( i 994): 34 7-68. 
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however, agents would merely need to make sure that they never intended 
the bad consequences of their acts, and as long as they did so, they would 
not run afoul of the DDE. 
Recognition of this fact may well lead to a deeper concern with the 
DDE, namely, the implication that an agent's intention can determine the 
rightness or wrongness of her act. As J udithJarvis Thomson observes, even 
if an agent's intention is relevant to the question of whether she ought to 
be praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished for her act, it seems odd to 
claim that an agent's intention can determine an act's permissibility or 
impermissibility.7 Imagine a case in which a bomber pilot can carry out 
an attack on a military target that will collaterally kill 10 noncombatants, 
but that will swiftly bring to an end a long and bloody war. Suppose 
further, however, that while the bomber pilot knows his attack will have 
this consequence, he does not aim at it. Rather, he has a long-standing 
childish feud with one of the noncombatants and so carries out the attack 
with the sole intention of killing that person. Though the bomber's poor 
character may repel us, surely we do not think it makes his act, one that 
ends a long and bloody war, impermissible. Yet the DDE appears to have 
precisely this implication.8 
Thus far we have identified two challenges to the use of the DDE to 
justify certain collateral damage-causing acts of war. First, it is not clear 
that we can characterize the idea of what an agent intends and the idea of 
what an agent merely foresees so that the DDEjustifies all and only those 
acts of war we intuitively judge to be permissible. Second, it seems odd to 
think that an act that would otherwise be wrong can be made right simply 
because of what an agent intends to achieve by it, and vice versa. The 
philosopher Warren Quinn offers a response to each of these challenges. 
Quinn suggests that a person can be properly described as intending 
harm to others when the harm comes to the victims "at least in part from 
the agent's deliberately involving them in something in order to further 
his purpose precisely by way of their being so involved."9 In contrast, an 
7 Judith.Jarvis Thomson, "Self Defense," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 4 ( 19~)1 ): 283-
c\ IO; Thomson, "Physician Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments," Ethics 109 ( 1999): 
497-5 18. 
8 In addition to Thomson's discussion of this objection to the DOE, see also T. ,\L Scanlon, 
"Intention and Permissibility!," Aristotrlian Socirty Supplementary Volume 74 (2000): 
304-5; F. M. Kamm, "Failures ofJmt \\'ar Theory: Terror, Harm, and Justice," Ethics 114 
(2004): 666-69. 
9\Varren S. Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double 
Effect," reprinted in Ethirs: Problmzs and l'riJl(i/1/cs, ed . .John l\lartin Fischer and '.\lark 
Ravizza (Orlando, FL: Harcourt BraceJm·anm·ich, 1992): 18+ 
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agent merely foresees that his act will result in harm to others if he does 
not involve them in something for this reason, or his involving them in 
something for this reason does not contribute to the harm they suffer. 
Using Quinn's characterization of intending harm, it is possible to distin-
guish terror bombing from tactical bombing. The terror bomber involves 
those noncombatants she kills in the bombing precisely because doing 
so will further her goal oflowering enemy morale. This is so whether she 
aims to kill them or aims only to make them appear dead. Thus she can 
be properly characterized as intending the deaths of the noncombatants 
she kills. On the other hand, the tactical bomber does not involve those 
noncombatants he kills because doing so will further his goal; since this 
is not his reason for involving them, he can be properly characterized as 
merely foreseeing their deaths. Assuming the proportionality condition 
is met, the tactical bomber acts justifiably according to the DDE, while 
the terror bomber does not. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Quinn provides a satisfactory 
account of the difference between intending harm to others and merely 
foreseeing that one's act will cause harm to others as a side effect. It 
remains necessary to explain why this distinction makes a difference to 
the moral permissibility of an agent's act. Holding all else equal, why does 
the fact that an agent involves others in something precisely in order to 
further his purpose by doing so render that act morally wrong? Why is 
it that were this not the reason why the agent involved those others, his 
act would be morally permissible? Quinn responds to these questions 
as follows. The terror bomber sees the noncombatants as "material to 
be strategically shaped or framed by his agency," an opportunity to be 
exploited in the pursuit of victory in the war. 10 The tactical bomber, on the 
other hand, does not have this attitude toward the noncombatants he kills; 
he does not view them "as if they were then and there for his purposes." 11 
Quinn claims that taking this attitude to noncombatants - seeing them 
(and their deaths) as merely then and there for his purposes- constitutes 
a wrong done to them distinct from any other harm they suffer. 12 He 
concludes, therefore, that there is a greater moral presumption against 
wibid., 187. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Quinn writes, "This aspect of direct agency [people being involved in something at the 
cost of something protected by their independent moral rights (such as their life, their 
bodily integrity, or their freedom)] adds its own negative moral force - a force over and 
above that provided by the fact of harming or failing to prevent harm" (Quinn, "Actions," 
187). 
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actions like that of the terror bomber than actions like that of the tactical 
bomber. 
But why does adopting a certain attitude toward noncombatants count 
as a wrong done to them distinct from, and in addition to, any wrong they 
suffer in virtue of their treatment at the hands of the terror bomber? 13 
Unless some sense can be made of the claim that merely by thinking 
of the noncombatants as "then and there for his purposes," the terror 
bomber wrongs them, Thomson's point about the evaluative significance 
of an agent's intention (or attitude) applies. Because the terror bomber 
views noncombatants as mere strategic opportunities to be exploited, we 
may judge him to be a worse person than the tactical bomber. Yet on the 
assumption that both bombers inflict the same harm, in the same way, on 
the same number of noncombatants, nothing appears to distinguish the 
actions themselves. In both cases, the noncombatants e1tjoy a right not to 
be killed unjustly. Unless they have done something to forfeit that right, or 
they have voluntarily waived it, their deaths at the hands of a combatant 
who can (or should) reasonably foresee that his action will have this 
consequence violates those noncombatants' rights. Indeed, Quinn may 
recognize this, for he does not use the DDE to show that tactical bombing 
is permissible, while terror bombing is not, but rather to show that the 
latter is morally worse than the former. It appears, therefore, that even if 
we accept Quinn's claim that in adopting the attitude he does, the terror 
bomber commits a distinct wrong to the noncombatants he involves in 
his action, we are still no closer to a justification for collateral damage-
causing acts of war. 
Quinn does characterize people's rights as prima facie, meaning that 
in some cases they may be overridden or defeated by other (moral) con-
siderations. The proportionality condition of the DDE might then be 
understood to state when this happens: that is, what sorts of moral rea-
sons defeat the right in question. Perhaps, then, when Quinn states that 
the terror bombers' attitude makes his action morally worse than the 
tactical bomber's, he means to claim that the terror bomber must have a 
weightier or stronger reason tojustify his action than is required of the tac-
tical bomber. Such a view has much in common with one interpretation 
1:1 It may be that the attitude ofa person who c1mes harm to another can affect the amount 
of harm caused; for instance, the same plnsical harm clone from hatred ma\' inflict a 
greater psychological harm than if it""'"" done reckkssl\'. But Quinn docs not appear 
to ha\'e this sort of thing in mind in his discus.sion of the moral rek\'<lllCC of an a~ent's 
attitude toward the person he harms. 
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of Aquinas's understanding of the DDE.14 An agent's intention in carry-
ing out a normally prohibited act does not figure in the justification of 
that act. Rather, an agent's intention serves as a condition on that act's 
permissibility. In other words, the agent's intention is not what makes the 
act right (permissible); the presence of some other factor, call it X, does 
so. The agent's intention can make the act wrong (impermissible), how-
ever, even ifX is present. For example, though killing people is normally 
wrong, Aquinas believes it to be justifiable in self-defense. The justifiabil-
ity of such a killing does not require that the agent merely foresee, but 
not intend, the death of her unjust assailant. It does require, however, 
that in killing her unjust assailant, the agent intend only to protect her 
life; if she acts with the intention of trying out her new gun, then her act 
is not permissible. For Aquinas, a bad intention absolutely prohibits cer-
tain otherwise justifiable acts, while on the preceding interpretation of 
Quinn's claim, it merely makes such acts harder (but perhaps not impos-
sible) to justify. In both cases, though, the agent's intention does not 
justify the action, but instead serves as a condition on its permissibility. 
The same consideration that makes many people doubt that an agent's 
intention can affect the justifiability of an act also serves to undermine 
the claim that an agent's intention provides a condition on an otherwise 
permissible act. If an agent kills an unjust assailant because she wants to 
try out her new gun, most will think her character suspect, but many will 
also think her act justifiable. (Of course, knowledge of her intention may 
lead us to examine more carefully her claim that she was under unjust 
assault.) Perhaps a virtue ethicist such as Aquinas would argue that having 
the right intention is an essential ingredient of doing the right action (as 
the notion of a sin seems to combine both acting wrongly and having a 
bad intention). But it is not clear that virtue ethicists must make such a 
claim: they might define a right action as one that a virtuous person would 
do, without requiring that a person have the mental state necessary to 
count as virtuous. In any case, given our task of examining the conditions 
under which collateral damage-causing acts of war are morally justifiable, 
whether an agent's intention serves as a condition on the permissibility 
of an act is a less pressing issue than determining the grounds of the 
justification itself. Thus far, however, we have yet to do so. 15 
14 See Alison Mclnytre, "Doing Away with Double Effect," Ethics 111 (2001). 247-50. 
15 I regret that space does not permit me to discuss F. M. Kamm's multiple objections to the 
use of the DDE to justify collateral damage, or the various rationales she offers to defend 
causing (intended or unintended) harm to noncombatants in certain sorts of cases. 
Those interested in exploring these issues in greater detail are strongly encouraged to 
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II. Social Contract Arguments and Collateral Damage 
The arguments set out in the previous section suggest that the propor-
tionality condition of the DDE does all of the justificatory work, for it is 
this condition that establishes (or, perhaps better, reflects) the extent to 
which people are morally required to limit their conduct so as to avoid 
causing harm to others. tli The crucial issue, then, does not concern the 
combatant's state of mind when he carries out a particular collateral 
damage-causing act, but rather whether in doing that act he exceeds the 
bounds of what he is morally at liberty to do (or, to use a more contentious 
phrase, whether he violates the rights of those he collaterally kills). 
I suggested in the previous section that the proportionality condition 
is best formulated as requiring that a combatant have a sufficient reason 
to warrant doing an act that can be reasonably expected to cause harm to 
noncombatants. What sorts of considerations can provide such a reason? 
The usual formulation of the proportionality condition suggests a con-
sequen tialist response to this question: the fact that a given act of war 
inflicts harm on noncombatants proportional to the good achieved as 
a result of that same act provides a reason sufficient to justify it. Upon 
closer inspection, though, most of those who employ this formulation of 
the proportionality condition do not adhere very closely to consequen-
tialism. 17 For example, they tend to assume that the good achieved by an 
act of war must be significantly greater than the evil that same act causes 
in order for the act to be justifiable. Likewise, only certain sorts of goods 
or evils ought to figure in the calculation: the economic benefits of a 
particular act of war that harms noncombatants do not count toward that 
act's justifiability (except insofar as they contribute to a swifter victory 
in the war). A purely consequentialist approach would not accept these 
sorts of constraints on the justifiability of acts of war. 18 The fact that many 
read Kamm, "Failures of Just War Theory," as well as Kamm, ".Justifications for Killing 
Noncombatants in War," Midwest Studirs in Philosophy XXIV (2000): 219-28. 
16 Because of the DD E's focus on the combatant's state of mind when he carries out an 
attack, it~ defenders often emphasize that the proportionality condition requires com-
batants to exercise reasonable or due care to aYoid even unintentionally causing harm 
to noncombatants. But to exercise due care is simply to (make a good faith effort to) 
conform to certain standards setting out the extent to which people are morally required 
to limit their conduct so as to a\'oid causing harm to others. 
17 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; A.J Coates, 711f Fthirs of \for (:\!anchester, UK: Uniwrsity of 
Manchester Press, 1997) 245-4G. 
18 For those unclear as to why this is so, see the discu5'ion of consl'qnentialism in the 
following section. 
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discussants of proportionality in the context of the DDE do assume them 
provides one reason to think that the proportionality condition is not 
merely the ad hoc addition of a consequentialist moral principle to an 
essentially nonconsequentialist moral theory. 
Suppose that these philosophers are right to forgo using consequen-
tialist moral reasoning to determine what counts as a sufficient reason 
for causing collateral damage. What sort of nonconsequentialist argu-
ment might a theorist employ to illuminate the idea of a sufficient reason 
for causing harm to noncombatants? One possibility, recently discussed 
by David Rodin, involves an appeal to agents' exercise of autonomous 
choice. '9 Rodin begins his discussion of collateral damage by first consid-
ering what generally justifies acts that impose a risk of harm on people 
other than the actor. He suggests that two conditions must be met to justify 
them: first, "the party assuming the risk [must also be] the beneficiary of 
the risk-producing activity," and second, the risk must be "autonomously 
assumed either individually or collectively by those who bear [it] ."20 Thus 
a doctor is morally justified in performing a risky operation on a patient if 
he gives his free and informed consent to it, but not otherwise. Likewise, 
rules permitting police cars to speed or ambulances to run red lights are 
morally justifiable when they are the result of collective decisions that pro-
duce benefits for the community as a whole, on the condition that the risk 
of harm is distributed fairly across all members of the community. Thus, 
in a community with rules regulating the driving of ambulances that meet 
these conditions, an innocent bystander killed by an ambulance running 
a red light will not necessarily be wronged. 21 In sum, the fact that the rel-
evant agents exposed to a certain risk of harm from others' activities also 
benefit from those activities, and the fact that they have autonomously 
assumed that risk, entails that these agents have no claim not to suffer 
the harm they do when the risk is realized. That they have no such claim 
entails that the person who does the risky activity is morally free to act as 
he does; for example, the ambulance driver enjoys a moral liberty to run 
19 David Rodin, "Terrorism without Intention," Ethics 114 (2004): 752-7 i. 
20 Ibid., 766-67. 
21 I say not necessarily be wronged because there will likely be specific constraints on ambu-
lances running a red light, and an ambulance driver who does not adhere to those 
constraints will wrong the person he kills. Note, too, that the community may make it 
a condition for ambulances running red lights that those harmed as a result be com-
pensated by the ambulance company, the hospital, or the community as a whole. But 
when justified in this manner, such civil liability is not indicative of a moral wrong, and 
assuming that the ambulance driver obeyed the specific constraints on running a red 
light, he should not (and likely will not) be convicted of a crime. 
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red lights. It is this moral liberty, and the value of autonomous choice 
from which it is derived, that provides a sufficient reason for doing acts 
that, in some cases, cause harm to innocent parties (i.e., people who have 
done nothing that makes them liable to being harmed by this actor in 
this particular manner). 
Rodin's general justification for risky activities suffers from a number of 
shortcomings. 22 For example, it seems implausible to claim that authori-
tarian political communities such as China, North Korea, and Zimbabwe 
collectively decide that the benefits ofallowing ambulances to run red lights 
warrant the risk of harm to each member created by such a practice. Yet it 
also seems implausible to claim that the absence of such a collective deci-
sion necessarily renders the risk created by ambulances running red lights 
in those states morally unjustified. This difficulty with Rodin's argument 
can be met by shifting from a focus on actual consent to, or assumption 
of, risk, to some sort of hypothetical consent to, or assumption of, risk. It is 
because suitably specified agents would agree to a rule permitting ambu-
lances to run red lights (at least under certain conditions) that these 
practices are morally justifiable even in states like China or Zimbabwe, 
despite the fact that the actual rules governing the driving of ambulances 
in those states are not the product of a collective decision. 
Our concern, however, is not with the risk of harm to innocent parties 
created by ambulances running red lights, but rather with the risk of harm 
to noncombatants caused by acts of war. Drawing on his general account 
of what justifies risky activities, Rodin concludes that with the possible 
exception of humanitarian intervention, collateral damage-causing acts 
of war are morally unjustifiable. In most military conflicts, Rodin asserts, 
"there is no sense in which the party who bears the risk of harm benefits 
from the risky activity. Neither have they autonomously chosen, either 
individually or collectively, to bear the risks of the bombardment." 2 3 The 
conclusion we ought to draw, then, is that collateral damage-causing 
acts of war are morally unjustifiable.24 Noncombatants have a claim not 
to be exposed to the risk of harm that is a practically unavoidable con-
comitant of combat. It follows that combatants are not morally at lib-
erty to impose the risk of harm on noncombatants that they do impose 
22 I discuss these in greater detail in Lefkowitz, "Collateral Damage and Dirtv Hands," 
unpublished, on tile with author 
2 3 Rodin, "Terrorism," 767. 
2 4 Strictly speaking, Rodin claims onh that the standards of due care for waging war art> 
much higher than what is required bv existing mtcrnational humanitarian law. I lowc\cr, 
I believe that his argument actuallv entails th" <trnngcr conclusio11 set out in the text. 
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when they wage war. The absence of such a liberty means that combat-
ants do not have a sufficient reason to justify the harm they cause to 
noncombatants. 
It is not clear whether the move to hypothetical consent sketched here 
enables us to avoid the conclusion Rodin draws with respect to the moral 
justifiability of collateral damage. Whether it does so depends on how we 
ought to conceive of the agents negotiating the hypothetical agreement 
that establishes what sorts ofrisky activities are justifiable (in what circum-
stances, with what conditions, etc.), and perhaps also the circumstances 
in which they negotiate. Though space does not permit me to pursue 
that investigation here, it is worth noting some of the ways in which the 
conception of the agents' negotiating this hypothetical agreement will sig-
nificantly influence the case for or against the justifiability of collateral 
damage. For instance, the relative importance the hypothetical negotia-
tors assign to (their own) life and liberty will affect their willingness to 
assume the risks involved in the conduct of war. If, properly conceived, 
these agents assign life a far greater value than liberty, then they will place 
very narrow constraints on, and perhaps even absolutely forbid, acts of 
war that impose a risk of harm to noncombatants when undertaken in 
order to attain or protect individual liberty or political sovereignty. Con-
sider, too, the claim made by one prominent defender of the hypothetical 
consent approach to moral justification (broadly construed) that "the jus-
tifiability of a moral principle depends only on various individuals' reasons 
for objecting to that principle and alternatives to it." 2 5 That is, agents are 
to appeal only to the impact a particular principle and the alternatives to 
it will have on their own pursuit of a good life. This individualist restric-
tion may well rule out the argument that often seems to be lurking in 
the background in many discussions of collateral damage, namely, that 
collaterally killing some noncombatants is permissible if it is necessary 
to prevent some greater number of noncombatants from being killed. If 
true, the individualist restriction entails that no individual member of the 
larger group can point to the fact that more noncombatants will die if the 
collateral damage-causing act is forgone, since each may only appeal to 
his or her own death as a reason to reject a principle that forbids collat-
eral killing. It may be, then, that any hypothetical contract moral theorist 
committed to the individualist restriction will find it extremely difficult 
to justify collateral damage-causing acts of war. 
25 T. M. Scanlon, \!\-'hat We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1998)~ 229. 
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At this point, I think it safe to draw the following conclusions. First, the 
DDE does not provide a compelling justification for collateral damage. 
Even apart from any difficulties there may be in specifying the concepts 
of intended harm and merely foreseen harm (or harm as a side effect), it 
remains unclear why we should view the agent's intention as relevant to 
the rightness or wrongness of his act. Moreover, we do not yet have a con-
vincing account of the proportionality condition: that is, of what sorts of 
considerations provide a sufficient reason to justify acts of war that it is rea-
sonable to expect will cause collateral damage. Contrary to what some of 
their remarks might suggest, most of those who discuss the proportion-
ality condition do not appear to be employing consequentialist moral 
reasoning. Yet as we have just seen, one of the most common forms of 
nonconsequentialist reasoning, namely, appeal to actual or hypothetical 
agreement, may not yield a justification for collateral damage. Impor-
tantly, this is so regardless of whether the agent's intentions matter to 
the moral justifiability of his acts (i.e., whether the DDE is a true moral 
principle, or not). Barring further argument, therefore, it appears that 
nonconsequentialist moral theorists ought to conclude that collateral 
damage-causing acts of war are morally unjustifiable. 
III. Consequentialism and Collateral Damage 
On the one hand, it appears that consequentialist moral theories can 
easily justify collateral damage. Despite the fact that they inflict harm 
on noncombatants, a particular collateral damage-causing act of war is 
morally justifiable insofar as it produces a net increase in social utility 
or welfare, for instance, if that act prevents an even greater amount of 
harm to (an even greater number of) other noncombatants. On the other 
hand, given a consequentialist account of the just conduct of war, there 
is no reason to be concerned specifically with the justification of collat-
eral damage (at least as defined at the outset of this chapter), for if we 
ought to be concerned only with the overall consequences of an act, and 
in particular with whether that act produces a net increase in total wel-
fare, then it should make no difference whether those harmed by the act 
are legitimate or illegitimate targets of war, or whether the harm done to 
noncombatants is intended or merely a foreseen side·effect. Indeed, once 
we adopt a consequentialist approach, it seems that the very distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war disappears. A conse-
quentialistjustification for acts of war appears to entail that no person or 
category of persons is necessarily such that targeting him (i.e., mtending 
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to do him harm) is morally impermissible. While the consequentialist 
might still distinguish between the harm a combatant aims to cause and 
that which he merely foresees he will cause, this distinction will not be 
viewed as having any moral significance in itself. 
While consequentialism clearly can provide a moral justification for 
collateral damage, some readers may find deeply unsettling the implica-
tion that, under the right conditions, combatants may intentionally harm 
noncombatants. That is, a strong conviction that combatants ought not 
to target noncombatants, even if doing so will produce better overall 
consequences, may lead some to reject the use of consequentialist moral 
reasoning to justify acts of war, including those that cause collateral dam-
age. In response, a sophisticated consequentialist will likely adopt one of 
the follmving two strategies. Either she will argue that despite the appear-
ances to the contrary, consequentialism does absolutely forbid targeting 
noncombatants. Or she will argue that consequentialism forbids targeting 
noncombatants in all those cases where, intuitively, most people believe 
it would be wrong to do so, but also argue that in a few cases most people 
will conclude that it is permissible to harm noncombatants intentionally, 
and that consequentialism justifies these beliefs. I briefly describe each 
of these strategies in turn. 
The claim that consequentialism cannot justify an absolute prohibition 
on targeting noncombatants assumes that an act's consequences are what 
make a particular act right or wrong. 26 Specifically, act-consequentialism 
identifies an act as wrong ifand only ifit produces less good overall than 
would have been produced by some alternative act the agent could have 
done. However, some consequentialists reject this criterion for the right-
ness or wrongness of an act. Instead, they argue that while consequences 
alone provide the justification for moral rules or principles, what makes a 
particular act wrong is that it violates one or more of these moral rules or 
principles. This account of right action is called rule-consequentialism. 2 7 
Suppose that, of all the possible rules for regulating acts of war that affect 
non combatants, the following rule produces the best consequences: 
26 Such a claim also assumes that it is not necessarily true that targeting noncombatants 
will always produce worse consequences than those that will result from only targeting 
combatants. 
2 7 A reader familiar with the details of consequentialism will recognize that the descriptions 
in the text of both act and rule consequentialism are very rough. For example, no effort 
is made to distinguish between actual and expected versions of either criterion for right 
action, or between full and partial compliance versions. I set aside these important details 
in the interest of providing greater accessibility to a wide audience. 
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combatants may never carry out acts of war that target noncombatants, 
but they may carry out acts of war that they foresee will result in harm to 
noncombatants as a side effect, as long as that harm is proportional to the 
good achieved by those acts of war. According to rule-C, only those acts 
that conform to this rule are morally permissible, and what makes them 
permissible is that they conform to this rule. What makes the rule one 
to which combatants ought to conform is that no other rule produces 
better consequences. Thus rule-C reconciles many people's conviction 
that noncombatants ought never to be a target of war with the conse-
quentialist claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act is ultimately a 
matter of its consequences. Indeed, if rule-C does in fact justify the rule 
set out previously, then it provides a consequentialist justification for the 
DDE. 28 
Whether rule-C provides a convincing justification for some collateral 
damage-causing acts of war depends ultimately on its plausibility as a gen-
eral account of right and wrong actions. 2 9 But even if rule-C ultimately 
proves to be indefensible, a consequentialist may adopt the second strat-
egy noted previously in order to defend the justifiability of killing in war, 
including in some cases intentionally or unintentionally killing noncom-
batants. 
She will begin by noting that, in general, act-consequentialism does not 
justify intentionally causing harm to noncombatants. This is so for a num-
ber of reasons. First, at least in the near term, noncombatants typically 
pose much less threat of future harm than do combatants. Therefore, 
killing the typical noncombatant will do little to prevent future harm, 
though it will cause substantial harm in the present. Second, the belief 
that an opposing state's military is trying to harm their compatriot non-
combatants appears to strengthen the commitment to continuing the 
war on the part of both combatant and noncombatant members of the 
victim state. During World War II, both the British and the German air 
forces carried out massive attacks against each other's urban noncom-
batant populations, allegedly from the belief that it would so demoralize 
the general population that they would press their governments to sue 
for peace. In fact, these bombing campaigns may well have had exactly 
z:l Note that given a rule consequentialistjustification for the DD£, whether an ageut intends 
or merely foresees that he ,,.ill harm noncombatants has no importance in itself. Rather, 
what justifies adherence to a rule that prohibits intending harm while allowing merely 
foreseen harm (that is proportional) is that it produces the best consequences. 
2 9 For one defense of a rule C approach to the just conduct of war, see R. B. Brandt, 
"Utilitarianism and the Rules of\\'ar," l'hi/osop!tv and l'uhlu· ,1fjilin ( 1971172): q5-G,;. 
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the opposite effect. Given the view that what justifies particular acts of 
war is that they produce less harm than would result from alternative acts 
open to the agent, and given that in most cases intentionally attacking 
noncombatants tends to prolong the war, and so increases the harm it 
produces, the act-C will conclude that deliberate attacks on noncombat-
ants are rarely justifiable.3° Finally, one party's decision to adopt a policy 
of intentionally targeting or recklessly endangering noncombatants may 
lead other parties involved in the war to adopt a similar policy. Such a 
chain of events will almost certainly result in worse consequences than 
if the parties to the conflict generally make their behavior conform to a 
rule like the DDE. 
The reader will surely have noticed that all of the preceding claims 
contain qualifiers like "in general," "typically," and "usually." The act-
C may endorse something like the DDE as a rule of thumb, a useful 
heuristic device for determining whether a particular act of war is morally 
permissible. But since what justifies a particular act are its consequences, 
and not its conformity to a rule such as the DDE, the act-consequentialist 
must acknowledge that circumstances may arise in which it is permissible, 
indeed even obligatory, to act contrary to the rule. Thus while the act-
consequentialist's analysis of the DDE as a rule of thumb entails significant 
constraints on the just conduct of war, it will not satisfy those convinced 
that morality absolutely forbids intentionally killing noncombatants. 
The act-consequentialist may challenge this conviction, however, using 
the following example. Suppose that a general must choose between 
strategies A and B for capturing a militarily crucial city. Both of these 
strategies have the same probability of success, but strategy A will involve 
the death of 10,000 combatants, but no noncombatants, while strategy 
B will involve the death of 10 noncombatants, and no combatants. Is 
it really the case that the general must choose strategy A, and so the 
death of 10,000 people, over strategy B, and the death of only 10 people? 
Reflection on this case, or something like it, may lead many people to the 
conclusion that in rare cases, morality permits or even requires inten-
tional attacks against noncombatants. If so, then the conviction that 
must be accounted for is not "morality never permits intentionally killing 
3°This same reasoning may figure as well in a consequentialist account of why, in general, 
even merely foreseen harm to noncombatants is permissible only if the good achieved 
is significantly greater than the harm done. The perception that an opposing state's 
military forces care nothing for the harm they cause to noncombatants, though they do 
not intentionally target them, may also deepen the commitment of members of the victim 
state to prosecuting the war. 
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noncombatants" but rather "morality rarely permits intentionally killing 
noncombatants." Act-consequentialism not only accommodates the latter 
intuition, it also provides a rationale for it. 
Yet awareness of the fact that under certain conditions act-
consequentialism permits the targeting of noncombatants may lead com-
batants to do so even when these conditions are not met. Indeed, given the 
uncertainties endemic to warfare, and the likely biases of those engaged 
in them, combatants will almost certainly err when making such judg-
ments. It may be, then, that act-consequentialism will require combat-
ants to adhere strictly to a rule like the DDE, since by doing so they are 
more likely to act as morality requires - understood here in terms of pro-
ducing the best overall consequences - than if they try to determine in 
each particular case whether targeting noncombatants is morally permis-
sible.3' Thus both act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism may 
entail that when deliberating, combatants ought to abide by a rule like 
the DDE.32 
Though the preceding discussion suggests various ways in which a con-
sequentialist might justify collateral damage-causing acts of war, several 
concerns with such an argumentative strategy remain. First, I have sim-
ply assumed that consequentialism will justify a rule like the DDE, or at 
least a rule that corresponds to most people's intuitions regarding which 
acts of war are, or are not, morally justifiable. Yet this assumption may 
well be false; consequentialism may condone far more killing of non-
combatants, intentionally or unintentionally, than I have suggested here. 
Second, though the act-consequentialist may concede that instrumental-
epistemic considerations entail that combatants ought to adhere strictly 
to a rule like the DDE, she will regret this fact. That is, she will lament 
the fact that in some cases, though we know not which ones, combatants 
3' Note that this argument justifies adherence to the DDE even in those cases where the 
combatant would have produced better consequences in that particular instance had he 
acted contrary to the rule. 
32 Act consequentialists may not be the only ones who will defend adherence to the DDE on 
instrumental/ epistemic grounds, e\·en though they think that such a rule sometimes fails 
to reflect what morality truly requires. For example, a nonconscqucntialist might argue 
that only those who bear (a certain degree of) moral responsibility for an unjust war may 
be targeted. This may well entail that, in many wars, it is not inorally permissible to kill 
certain combatants, while it is penrnssible to kill certain noncombatants. H011·c,·er, this 
nonconsequentialist may also argue that in light of various facts about hunrnn nature and 
the circumstances of war, combatants will best approximate what moralitv truly requires 
if they adhere to the DDE, rather than seeking to determine in each case the legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of a potential target. 
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did not intentionally target noncombatants. Some of those convinced 
that targeting noncombatants is never morally permissible will find such 
an attitude troubling, and so find an act-consequentialistjustification for 
the absolute prohibition on intending harm to noncombatants unsatis-
factory. The act-consequentialist's regret points to a third concern with 
consequentialist accounts of just conduct in war, namely, that they do not 
take the separateness of persons seriously. Many philosophers argue that 
there are certain things you cannot do to a person, even if it will produce 
a substantial increase in overall welfare. Given its commitment to social 
or total welfare as the ultimate criterion for right action, consequential-
ism cannot provide a principled justification for this claim. Thus, even 
if consequentialism can provide a contingent justification for never tar-
geting noncombatants, it cannot justify this absolute prohibition on the 
grounds that noncombatants have a fundamental claim not to be used 
for the benefit of others (at least without their consent). 
N. Pacifism in Practice? 
More might be said in defense of each of the alleged moral justifications 
for collateral damage that I have discussed. Suppose, however, that even 
upon further consideration no defense proves to be satisfactory. If so, 
then it appears that in practice the moral person ought to become a 
pacifist, for it will be nearly impossible for him or her to wage war without 
acting immorally. Two responses to this conclusion are worth considering, 
though I cannot discuss them in detail here. First, one might claim that it 
is absurd to think that the use of armed force to resist genocide is morally 
justifiable only as long as it inflicts no collateral damage. We have more 
confidence in this judgment than in the theoretical argument against 
the permissibility of collateral damage-causing acts of war. Therefore, 
though at present we may lack a justification for collateral damage, we 
ought not to conclude that morality requires us to be pacifists. Second, 
even if all collateral damage-causing acts are wrong, might it still be a 
good thing (in some sense) that some of them are done? Making sense 
of this idea - namely, that collateral damage can be an instance of dirty 
hands - may prove impossible, but it seems worthy offurther exploration. 
